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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jorge Ferreira Tinoco appeals from his judgments of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance, contending the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss because of an alleged speedy trial
violation.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
Tinoco was indicted by the grand jury for the offenses of trafficking in
methamphetamine and delivery of a controlled substance.

(R., Vol. I, pp.16-17.)

Tinoco was arraigned on the indictment on April 15, 2011, and asserted his right to have
a speedy trial. (R., Vol. I, pp.24-25.) Jury trial was originally scheduled for July 6, 2011
but reset for August 16, 2011 because the grand jury transcript had not yet been
prepared.

(R., Vol. I, pp.30-31.) At a hearing on whether Tinoco should be tried with

his co-defendant, the district court took the issue under advisement and vacated the trial
date and reset the trial for September 20, 2011.

(R., Vol. I, pp.60-61.)

The court

granted ultimately ordered a joint trial. (R., Vol. I, pp.66-74.)
Jury trial commenced on September 20, 2011.

(R., Vol. I, pp.82-93 (minutes

from day one of the jury trial).) Before commencing the second day of trial, defense
counsel f0t Tinoco's co-defendant made a motion for mistrial because the trial court
erred by failing to consider the defense's Batson objection before swearing the jury.
(R., Vol. I, pp.94-96.) On day two of the jury trial, counsel for Tinoco joined the motion
for mistrial which was ultimately granted by the court. (R., Vol. I, p.96; 9/21/11 Tr., p.34,
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Ls.21-22.)

A new trial date was set, without objection, for November 1, 2011.

(9/21/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.22-23.)
Tinoco filed a motion to dismiss for an alleged violation of his speedy trial rights
on October 24, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.129-133.) Following a hearing, the district court
denied the motion to dismiss finding there had been "compliance with Idaho Code 193501 in that the matter was brought to trial" (10/31/11 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-13), and that
there was "good cause" for not holding the trial within six months (10/31/11 Tr., p.36,
L.12).
Tinoco was retried and a jury found him guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine
and delivery of a controlled substance. (R., Vol. 11, pp.215-216.) The court imposed a
unified sentence of 23 years with the first 10 years determinate on the trafficking
conviction and a concurrent unified sentence of 15 years with the first five years fixed on
the delivery charge.

(R., Vol. II, pp.228-229.)

pp.230-234.)
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Tinoco timely appealed.

(R., Vol. II,

ISSUE
Tinoco states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Tinoco's motion to dismiss because
the delay in bringing him to trial violated the speedy trial guarantee
protected by I.C. § 19-5301, the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Tinoco failed to show any error in the district court's conclusion that there was no
violation of Tinoco's statutory or constitutional rights to a speedy trial?
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ARGUMENT
Tinoco Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion He Failed To Show
A Violation Of His Speedy Trial Rights

A.

Introduction
Tinoco's case was brought to trial within the speedy trial limits. (See R., Vol. I,

pp.16-18 (filing of superceding indictment on April 7, 2011), pp.24-25 (arraignment on
superceding indictment on April 15, 2011 ), pp.82-93 (September 21, 2011 minutes of
first day of jury trial).)

The district court declared a mistrial upon Tinoco's motion

following the selection and swearing in of a jury and reset the jury trial for November 1,
2011.

(R., Vol. I, pp.94-97; 9/21/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.21-23.)

Although there was no

objection made to the new trial date, Tinoco filed a motion to dismiss for a speedy trial
violation on October 24, 2011. (R., Vol. I, pp.129-133.) The district court concluded
that there had been no violation of Tinoco's constitutional or statutory speedy trial rights.
(R., Vol. II, pp.142-143; 10/31/2011 Tr., p.29, L.11 - p.34, L.5.) Tinoco argues that the
district court erred. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-8.)

Application of the law to the facts as

found by the district court, however, shows that Tinoco has failed to carry his burden of
showing error.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether there was an infringement of a defendant's right to a speedy trial

presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Clark, 135 Idaho 255, 257, 16 P.3d
931,933 (2000); State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849,852,153 P.3d 1195, 1198 (Ct. App.
2006).

The appellate court defers to the trial court's findings of fact that are supported

by substantial and competent evidence, but freely reviews the trial court's application of
4

the law to the facts found. Avila, 143 Idaho at 852, 153 P.3d at 1198, State v. Davis,
141 Idaho 828,835, 118 P.3d 160, 167 (Ct. App. 2005).

C.

Tinoco's Statutory Speedy Trial Violation Claim Is Without Merit
Tinoco was entitled to dismissal without prejudice if he was not tried within six

months of his arraignment on the superceding indictment and there was not "good
cause" for delay. I.C. §§ 19-3501(3), 19-3506. Tinoco was in fact brought to trial within
the six months of his arraignment. Tinoco's jury trial commenced on September 20,
2011 with a jury sworn before the district court granted a defense motion for mistrial on
September 21. This was over three weeks before Tinoco's speedy trial ran. Tinoco
argues that "the district court's error in misleading counsel regarding the timing of the
Batson challenge does not justify setting the trial outside the speedy trial period."

(Appellant's brief, p.7.) Tinoco argues that because there was no good cause for the
shown for the delay in trial, "the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss
regardless of whether the additional Barker factors also weigh towards dismissal." (Id.)
The statute does not require a trial must go to verdict within six months of
arraignment.

Interpreting the statute to contemplate a retrial after a mistrial must be

held within six months of arraignment is outside the plain meaning of the text of the
statute. Because Tinoco was brought to trial within the statutory six months, there was
no speedy trial violation.

D.

Tinoco Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Conclusion He Failed To
Show A Violation Of His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights
Even if Tinoco's trial date following the mistrial declared in his first trial

constituted a delay of his speedy trial, there was good cause shown for such delay.
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"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of the
Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to speedy trial." State v.
Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. App. 2007). When analyzing
claims of speedy trial violations under the state and federal constitutions, the Idaho
appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing test set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho
113,117, 29 P.3d 949,953 (2001); Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; State v.
Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be
considered are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
defendant's assertion of his or her right to speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned
by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Application of this legal standard to the facts
found by the district court shows that Tinoco's claim of error fails.

1.

The Length Of The Delay Is Neither Sufficient To Trigger Balancing Nor
Does It Weigh In Tinoco's Favor

"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the
other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. For purposes of the
Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the date there is 'a formal
indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to
answer a criminal charge.'" Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United
States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,320 (1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.)
"Similarly, under the Idaho Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date
formal charges are filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Lopez,
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144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test is
triggered, the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at
853, 153 P.3d at 1199.
The delay in this case did not trigger any presumption of prejudice. In Doggett v.
United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652 (1992), the Supreme Court of the United States held
that this factor required a "double enquiry." The first enquiry is whether "the interval
between accusation and trial" had become "presumptively prejudicial."

&

This part of

the enquiry is necessary because a defendant may not claim that the government has
denied him of a speedy trial if the government "has, in fact, prosecuted his case with
customary promptness."

&

The Court stated in a footnote that pretrial delay therefore

does not generally trigger speedy trial enquiry until it "at least ... approaches one year."

kl at 652

n.1. Here the time between arraignment on the indictment trial was less than

seven months, a period of time insufficient to trigger the presumption of prejudice.
Even if the threshold enquiry had been met here, Tinoco has failed to show that
bringing him to trial in less than seven months weighs in favor of finding a violation of
speedy trial rights. Bringing Tinoco to trial less than seven months after his arraignment
simply does create much, if any, presumption of prejudice.

2.

The Granting Of A Mistrial Constituted A Valid Reason For The Brief
Delay

Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656);
State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 837, 118 P.3d 160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that
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reason, different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407
U.S. at 531. As explained by the Supreme Court:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather
than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.

kl at 531

(footnote omitted). In this case the 41 day delay engendered by granting of a

mistrial was appropriate because it was based a trial error.
The district court set forth the undisputed facts relevant to the speedy trial issue
as follows:
As a factual basis, generally, the Court finds that on April 15th ,
2011, the defendant was - and I'm referring to Mr. Tinoco, because Mr.
Tinoco's the one who has stood on his speedy trial rights in this base. But
he was arraigned on two felony drug offenses. He was charged by
superseding [sic] indictment in this case. Count 1 charges him with
trafficking in methamphetamine or amphetamine. Count 2 charged him
with delivery of a controlled substance. To this charge, Mr. Tinoco plead
[sic] not guilty, and specifically asserted his rights to have a speedy trial.
The trial was originally scheduled for August 15th , 2011. That trial
was continued and reset within the speedy trial period. Trial setting,
again, September 21 5 \ 2011 are the reason, at least obvious on the
record, for resetting the trials, because I believe when these matters first
came to trial, they were not consolidated, and there were some issues that
arose on that date. Then there was a motion to consolidate on or about
that date. And ultimately, this Court decided to consolidate, and then
subsequently denied a motion to sever the trials.
The motion to consolidate was on or about July 25 th , 2011. The
August 15th , 2011 trial was vacated and a new jury trial was scheduled for
September 20 th ; is that - am I - I've been saying September 20 th first [sic],
but is it September 20th ? I guess the trial was commenced on September
20 th , 2011 . So the record needs to be corrected to reflect it was the
September 20 th , 2011 trial. The status conference was September 1gt\
2011. So I'll correct the record to reflect the jury trial at issue was
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scheduled to commence September 20 th , 2011, and that is the date that
the issues of the multiple Batson - the Batson challenge arose.
Judge Morfitt ruled that the Batson challenge was not properly
raised prior to the jury being sworn, but accepted responsibility as the
Court for, perhaps, creating uncertainty or confusion, acknowledging that
the attorneys advised him of their Batson challenge off the record, and
that he had, basically, indicated he wanted to get the jury taken care of, or
something to that effect, which he went ahead and seated the jury, and
excused the other jurors while the attorneys were still waiting, I believe, to
address the Batson issues.
Thereafter, Mr. Sisson [counsel for Tinoco's co-defendant] made a
motion for a mistrial, and Mr. Briggs [counsel for Tinoco] joined in that
motion for a mistrial. Court acknowledged it potentially misled defense
counsel outside the courtroom, and a a result of that, declared a mistrial
accepting responsibility for that problem. The Court set a new trial date
for November 1st, 2011. The record, as far as my review, indicates the neither the Court nor either attorney indicated on the record at that time
that the November 1st, 2011 date was not within the speedy trial date,
which was October 1ih, 2011, according to this Court's calculation. The
new trial setting, which is for tomorrow, November 1st, 2011, exceeds the
- or goes beyond the original set speedy trial date of October 1ih, 2011,
appears 18 days.
(10/31/11 Tr., p.24, L.23 - p.27, L.14.)

Regarding the mistrial, the district court

concluded: "I do not find it was delay caused by the State or Defense in this case, but,
in fact, the Court." (10/31/11 Tr., p.32, Ls.9-11.) These findings more than support the
district court's determination that the mistrial was based on a valid reason, and therefore
any attendant delay was also reasonable.

3.

Although Tinoco Asserted His Constitutional Speedy Trial Rights At The
Time Of His Arraignment, He Did Not Object To The District Court's Trial
Setting Following The Granting Of His Motion For A Mistrial

The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant asserted
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his right is "entitled
to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of
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the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171.
"Failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial." Davis, 141 Idaho at 839, 118 P.3d at 171. Although Tinoco
asserted his speedy trial rights upon his arraignment on the indictment, he did not object
to the mistrial or the trial setting in the new trial. Tinoco did not complain of a potential
speedy trial violation until he filed a motion to dismiss on October 24, 2011, 33 days
after the mistrial and scheduling of the new trial. (R. Vol. I, pp.129-133.) As the district
court found, "when balanced and compared to the reason for the continued trial and the
time delay involved, ... it's [not] an overriding factor either way." (10/31/11 Tr., p.32,
L.24 - p.33, L.2.) Thus, this factor does not weigh heavily in Tinoco's favor.

4.

Tinoco Failed To Establish That He Was Unfairly Prejudiced By The Delay

The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature and
extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. Barker, 407
U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118
P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which
the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those interests are (1) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration, (2) to minimize anxiety and
concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the possibility that the defense will
be impaired.
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). Accord
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 854, 153 P.3d at
1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of these is the most
significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the defense 'skews the
fairness of the entire system."' Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 P. 3d at 1290 (citing
10

Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 583, 990 P.2d 742, 749
(Ct. App. 1999)).
Although Tinoco was in custody the entire time the charges were pending, he
made no claim below that the delay from his arrest in any way prejudiced his ability to
defend himself at trial except to assert at the motion hearing that the state's case got
stronger with the recently completed fingerprint analysis on evidence pointing to the
culpability of Tinoco. (10/31/2011 Tr., p.23, Ls.5-17.) There is no assertion that the trial
was in way delayed to obtain such forensic results, just that the testing only became
complete after the mistrial. (10/31/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.10-19.) As noted by the district
court, this is not the "kind of prejudice that was contemplated in the cases dealing with
this issue." (10/31/2011 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-5.)
district court was pre-trial incarceration.

The only relevant prejudice found by the
(10/31/2011 Tr., p.33, Ls.3-18.)

Pre-trial

incarceration, alone, does not cause this factor to weigh in Tinoco's favor.

5.

A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A
Speedy Trial Violation

The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, must be
balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a speedy trial was
violated.

Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case the time from arraignment to trial was

relatively short. It was not enough to trigger speedy trial analysis. Even if enough to act
as a trigger, it was only barely enough. That the delay was minimal weighs heavily in
favor of the district court's ruling.

The reason for delay also strongly supports the

determination that there was no speedy trial violation because the only delay
complained of was due to granting of Tinoco's motion for a mistrial. The third factor
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also does not weigh heavily in Tinoco's favor because, although Tinoco did assert his
right early on, he failed to object to the new trial date.
prejudice.

Finally, there was minimal

This final factor ultimately weighs in favor of the district court's ruling.

Because these factors weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation, Tinoco has
failed to show error in the denial of his motion to dismiss.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Tinoco's judgments of
conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine and deli ery of a controlled substance.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 6th day of May 2013 caused a true an
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the United
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
Robyn Fyffe
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, Idaho 83701
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